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Introduction
These notes draw particularly on the ideas of Daniel Willis, as expressed in his
book The Emerald City and Other Essays on the Architectural Imagination,
(Princeton Architectural Press, New York, 1999), concerning the nature of
different productive and unproductive forms of activity. Specifically, the
demarcation of such activities in terms of the categories of labour and work
are used as a basis for interrogating some forms of creative practice. One
particular characteristic of both labour and work is found in its objective and
subjective organization of time. These notes question those practitioners who
produce ‘works’ of art by the means of labouring productive action, including
its particular organization of time.
Labour, work and play
According to Daniel Willis
If we are to understand the nature of practices such as building
and caring for a house, preparing for a festival, tending a garden,
decorating a Christmas tree, or proudly polishing one’s automo-
bile, we must restore the distinction between ‘labour’ and ‘work’
that has been lost since the advent of industrialization. We must
look more closely at activities such as these, in which we are likely
to develop emotional and imaginative attachments to things, and
to care for them to a degree that belies their use or exchange
value (Willis 1999: 240).
According to Willis, Hannah Arendt noted that as opposed to ‘work’,
‘labour’ does not designate a finished object, product or durable object. The
focus is more on the activities making up the process of producing something
rather than on the finished object. The judgment, autonomy and end-focused
rationale found in work is missing from labour. Hence, in Willis’s approach
(and somewhat confusingly for those of us coming from a sociology back-
ground), labour is associated with what others have called work, that is,
what we may call imposed, non-autonomous productive actions; in common
parlance ‘going to work’. For Willis this should be ‘going to labour’. Willis
continues:
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As opposed to the laborer, the human fabricator (homo faber)
works not in response to necessity, but in order to construct a
‘world’. In other words, the activity of work has not just a prac-
tical goal, but also an imaginative one. Beyond their immediate
utility, human artifacts help to organize and structure our exis-
tence (Willis 1999: 241).
For Arendt this means that the artefacts themselves should aim towards
permanence, stability and durability. However, for Willis it is the durability
and stability of the imaginary world produced that is significant. For exam-
ple, a gardener or chef does not produce through work particularly durable
artefacts (though they do constitute a significant material world) but they
do produce sustained and durable imaginative worlds.
If we allow the lack of durability, the perishability, or biological
necessity of something we produce to determine that it has been
the result of labour instead of work, then the activities of many
of our most skillful makers would be mistakenly excluded from
the province of work (Willis: ibid).
Again, drawing upon the ideas of Hannah Arendt (The Human Condi-
tion, The University of Chicago Press, 1958), Willis goes on to consider other
characteristics of productive activity, arguing for example, that repetitive
rhythmic motions were likely to be an indicator of labour because they were
characteristic of machines and the accommodation of people to machine pro-
duction. However, we find such repetitive actions in work as well as labour
such that all usually work contains periods of labour (routine preparation
of materials, the use of machinery and so on) and, conversely most labour
contains elements of work.
Following Willis, can go on to construct a general classification of activity
and consider some more content. As a rough shorthand we can character-
ize these three actions thus: Labour corresponds to unimaginative productive
activity, work to imaginative productive activity (this includes playful labour
or productive play) and, play corresponds to deliberately unproductive imag-
inative/physical activity (Figure 1).
According to Willis labour may be intensely productive in short bursts
but its monotony, and lack of sustainability make it less productive overall
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Figure 1: Willis’s ‘spectrum’ of imaginative versus productive activities -
adapted
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than work. Work only can be sustained for long periods. Moreover, play is
unsustainable due to its lack of productivity though one who plays is more
free than one who works because of works focus on necessity,
‘. . . the uniqueness of work lies in its ability to trope cleverly
the necessity of production into an imaginative undertaking that
creates a world (Willis 1999: 244).
Hence, work and play can both ‘make’ and ‘make up’ a world, that is, ‘pro-
duce’ both a materially and imaginatively significant realm, whereas labour
can only make a world, it cannot make one up. The imaginative necessity
that guides the productive action of work and the unproductive action of
play is absent from labour.
‘Because labour cannot both make and make up a world, it can
be tolerated or justified only by virtue of its outcome -what it
physically produces. . . Labour can be measured solely in terms of
its output and efficiency (244).
History shows us that at many times and in many places those who control
labour and labourers have deployed all manner of resources and techniques
in order to prevent labourers from playing or from attempting to turn labour
into work through the exercise of imagination. Those who labour are gener-
ally ‘not free to consider ‘indeterminate concepts’, to imagine and weigh out-
comes, or to exercise the judgement necessary for ethical judgement’ (Willis
247).
Time in labour, work and play
Willis goes on to consider the experience, organisation and quality of time
associated with his spectrum of actions. Labour is co-ordinated by and helps
to constitute the linear, homogeneous measured time of the clock. It is also
oblivious to cyclical time with its close association with natural rhythms;
hunger, sleep, night and day, the passage of the seasons and so on. This
linear, labour time is resonant with the technical, efficiency determinants of
commodity production - ‘time is money’.
Conversely, the time of work and play is both quantitatively and qualita-
tively different. Quantitatively it differs because,
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As opposed to the universal time of labour, work time and play
time are ‘fulfilled’ or ‘autonomous’ times. Time spent at these ac-
tivities cannot be measured by clocks or judged by its production
alone, for, in the case of play, there are no tangible products, and,
in the case of work, the value attributed to the endeavor must ac-
count for both the product and the positive feelings engendered
in its making. Because they create a world, work time and play
time create their own variable and unpredictable times, fictive
times that have only an intransitive relationship with universal
clock time’ (Willis 1999: 248).
Subjectively, the character of time in work and play is also different from
that of labour. It is a commonplace that those involved in play, for example,
a football match, express surprise that the clock measured duration of the
game feels so out of ‘sync’ with the time subjectively experienced by those
playing.1 This is often even more marked during work activities as, unlike
timed play, these periods may be open-ended and ‘timed’ predominantly in
relation to the attending to cyclical rhythms - hunger, tiredness, the need to
visit the toilet, falling darkness and so on. And, of course, all workers work
at a different rate such that, unlike in labour, there can be no overarching
time or shared time frame for the completion of all work activities.2
In a sense these times should not be seen as subjective at all. They may
differ, overlap and be distinct from person to person, activity to activity but,
they are best seen as created from the activities themselves, that is, they are
‘real’ times which could form the basis of measurement systems (though this
would be difficult). More importantly, these other created work times illus-
trate that measured ‘clock’ time is not a natural phenomenon corresponding
to actual events which structure it. Indeed, international measures of time
have been constructed to coincide with this system (eg, the expulsion of a cer-
tain amount of radiation from a particular radioactive atomic nucleus is what
defines the second). Such clock time is not even existentially related to series
1Those who willingly play an organised game clearly submit themselves to the time
of the game and consequently a certain amount of clock watching is evident especially in
competitive games.
2As educators of various workers (artists, designers, craftspeople) we continually at-
tempt to get them to submit their working practices to the times characteristic of labour,
something they may have to do when in the ‘real’ world.
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of natural rhythms which form the basis for other temporal schemas and
which still persist overlaid upon industrial society, for example, the siesta.
Such ‘immeasurable’ times Willis contrasts to the time of leisure which
he argues is locked into the same temporal logic as labour rather than work
or play. Leisure time,
is the mirror image of labour time: meaningless unproductive
time, instead of meaningless productive time. Leisure time does
not challenge our modern conceptualization of time as money;
leisure time, like labour time, is fleeting time that must be spent
(Willis 1999: 250).
So, according to Willis (Figure 2):
• Labour corresponds to meaningless productive time - measured time
• Work corresponds to meaningful productive time - immeasurable time
• Play corresponds to meaningful unproductive time - immeasurable time:
Figure 2: Action and time - adapted from Willis
And, we can add, that leisure corresponds to meaningless unproductive
time - measured time
Hence, leisure does not easily fit onto Willis’s spectrum, it will not go to
the left of work as here activities are more meaningless but also productive.
It will not fit to the right of work as here activities would be expected to
be more meaningful though less productive. We can offer an alternative
‘mapping’ (Figure 3, apologies for poor quality).
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Figure 3: Mapping labour, work, play and leisure
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The designations of ‘pure’ play, ‘pure’ labour etc, merit comment as, in
reality, it must be conceded that it is difficult to define what these may mean.
Pure labour: totally, physically and intellectually controlled productive
activity. This is actually unlikely to be very sustainable. Even slavery, con-
centration camp forced labour and the like cannot successfully totally control
the imagination as this runs the risk of depriving the labourer of the myriad
judgements that must be made within the labour process, including the loss
of the simple initiative needed to remain safe. However, much labour does
approach this limit and many employers do their upmost to push labourers
as close to this edge as possible.
Pure work: sustainable, enjoyable work defined by immeasurable time,
absorption and self-fulfilment. Even here, necessity, especially biologically,
and tasks characterised by linear time, are likely to draw the worker back
to labour concerns. This would be more so for designers than for artists
as designers are already working within a framework highly coloured by the
imperatives of labour.
Pure play: again, unsustainable due to biological necessity or attenuated
by its rule/norm bound character. Willful self and other-directed destructive
nihilism is likely to slide into chaos.
Pure leisure: probably does not exist in reality but the passive, forced
entertainment of Dystopian culture, mass rallies and, for some critics, tele-
vision would fit here, as would much of the ‘programmed’ leisure identified
by some critical social theorists.
Artists and creative practice
Artists are placed both by Arendt and Willis in the work quadrant though
they are not the only workers left in societies such as ours, many craftspeople
and other artisans could be included. Indeed, part of the general cultural
dissatisfaction and cultural experimentation observable over the last decade
or so has had as one aim, sometimes its central aim, the transformation of
labour into work and the defence of work against pressures to transform it
into labour.
According to Willis:
9
. . . artists are most likely to reject the usual compensations offered
by an economic system that rewards laboring more than work, in
favor of less measurable returns (Willis 1999: 251).
Willis then makes a very interesting comment concerning the nature of
artistic production and that which is produced from such creative, production
action;
We should also recognize that one of the attributes of art, one
‘blessing’ bestowed on the products of the artist’s work, is also
the ability to create ‘worlds’. In this way the work of art mirrors
the work on art that produces it. Each of them -the fulfilling pro-
ductive activity and the product with which we actively engage
to find fulfillment- have the ability to create world where time
deviates from universal clock time. This kind of temporal dis-
ruption (which is similar to that of the festival) can therefore be
utilized to identify the presence of art. Once we have recognized
this fact, we can begin to employ it as a means of art criticism
(Willis: ibid).
Here, we get to the gist of the matter for the subject of action in fine
art practice: Willis offer us a way to think about the products of artistic
practice in relation to the type of action which produced them. The emphasis
is not the nature of the artistic ‘product’ nor is it on the of the status of
the artist themselves nor on the ‘naming’ of art by either the artist or any
other cultural intermediary between artist and the audience. Consider, for
example, art that seeks to recreate the activity of labour as the means by
which the product of art is created, and, of course, the product itself. If we
follow the above reasoning then we may acknowledge:
1) That the product of labour can make a world but not make up a
world such that art-like products produced through the productive activity
of labour are just that, art-like and not art. We would recognize that mass
produced art (mechanically and digitally) would belong in this category, the
postcard is not the original painting.
2) Art is the result of work and the product of art work both makes a
world and makes up a world. Though, of course, not all work results in
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art though it does result in a similar ‘product’ both materially (sometimes,
sometimes not) and imaginatively significant and durable. The art event, for
example, may leave no material traces but can still be seen significantly and
imaginatively durable.
So far so good perhaps but what about ‘art’ that produces both a product
which is the same as the product of labour as well as producing it through
the activity of labour rather than that of work? The first questions that
occur to me are:
1) Why make ‘art’ which replicates the products of labour, i.e. that which
does not make up another world, transcend, or offer an alternative?
2) Why produce such ‘art’ through the activity of labour rather than
work? We could argue that the productive activity of labour whose outcome
is a product that makes a world but does not make up a world is not only not
art but is the antithesis of art. Does not using labour means, including the
measured, meaningless temporality of labour, to produce an outcome simply
collapse back into the imperatives of labour without examining them? If we
accept this then certain implications follow:
That such labour-driven ‘art’ is not art at all, either in terms of process or
product. If, on the other hand, such outcomes are art then what is going on
to produce them is not actually labour but a facsimile of labour; its is really
work masquerading as labour. This raises the question of its effectiveness in
drawing attention to the reality of labour as a process or to the products of
labour. According to Willis:
Whenever artists and musicians are paid by the hour, brush
stroke or note, when novelist or poets are compensated by the
line or word, we witness the corruption that occurs whenever
fulfilling activities are portrayed as commodities. . . Artists that
are paid for the products of their work have not necessarily ‘sold
out’. However, any artist or worker who allows her efforts to be
minutely quantified, either by measuring her time or some other
aspect of her output, will be tempted to distort her work to fit
the particular quantification method (Willis 1999: 252).
The ‘churning out’ of paintings that simply represent the world as it is
already made up, rather than making up a world of its own, may fit here,
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especially so if the artist has an annual contract with a gallery to produce
a certain number of paintings a year according to a fixed time schedule.
The artist may turn themselves into a one-person production line, adopt
the rhythms of linear clock time and so on. Alternatively, they may employ
others to produce the art for them. Not following the model of the apprentice
learning through daily contact with the master thus acquiring, developing
and nurturing the work of art but, rather as an often absent ‘entrepreneur’
or employer of waged labourers.
We can consider some other interesting ideas if we argue that those who
‘labour’ to produce art are not really labouring at all but are working. We
may look for evidence of this. The environment of production: is an artist
producing art in a gallery perhaps such that the appearance of labouring can
be seen to be part of a performance. If so, and despite the artists protes-
tations, what we are witnessing is work producing a facsimile of labour. It
is not labour itself. The overall organization of time: is it art/work time
or is it labour time? We may also consider the local organization of time;
does the artist control their own labour time, e.g. ‘knocking off’ when they
want, obeying the need to respond to cyclical biological necessity and so on.
If so, then, again, we are witnessing the time of work superimposed on a
representation of the time of labour. We can consider the larger cultural
framework in relation to the activity being presented. The labouring may
well be meaningful overall to the artist as there is a significant end point,
a conscious project, a made up world in mind, an overall self-consciousness
concerning the meaning of the activity and the exercise of fine judgements
within the productive activity itself. We can also look for the other com-
pensations including public interest or adulation, monetary compensation in
excess of that expected for labour and so on. All of these would tend to
support the view that what an audience in this context (another significant,
though, here, unexplored, facet in the definition of different kinds of produc-
tive action) is witnessing is work and the production of art rather than the
labour and the production of commodities. Conversely, if we step into the
workshop, or factory, of the artist-entrepreneur and witness paid employees,
imposed schedules, linear clock-time, surveillance, serial production and so
on, we may well be tempted to conclude that what we are seeing is labour
not work and that the end result is not art but the commodity masquerading
as art.
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